Implementation of FSB Key Attributes (as of May 2017)								
	Powers to transfer or sell assets and liabilities	**Powers to establish a temporary bridge institution**	**Powers to write down and convert liabilities (bail-in)**	**Power to impose temporary stay on early termination rights**	**Resolution powers in relation to holding companies**	**Recovery planning for systemic firms**	**Resolution planning for systemic firms**	**Powers to require changes to firms' structure and operations to improve resolvability**
Australia					(B)		(B)	1(B)
China							2	1
Hong Kong	3	3	3	3	3	(B)	3	3
Japan			4					
Korea			(B)	(B)		(B)	(B)	1
Singapore			(B)	(B)		(B)	(B)	1(B)

Current status of implementation	
	Implemented
	Partially implemented (all elements in the KA provision are satisfied but powers/requirements can be exercised only in limited circumstances)
	Not implemented (some or all of the elements in the KA provision are not satisfied)
Status of any pending reforms	
B	Reforms under development (policy proposals published or issued for intra-governmental consultation; draft legislation submitted to legislative body or rule-making process initiated under existing statutory authority)

1. Supervisory authorities have some powers to require supervised institutions to make changes to their business organisation and legal structure, but the purposes for and circumstances under which authorities can exercise such powers vary.

2. The jurisdiction is developing resolution plans only for G-SIBs, and not for other domestically incorporated banks that could be systemically significant or critical if they fail.

3. Hong Kong's Financial Institutions (Resolution) Ordinance was passed by the legislative council on 22 June 2016 and is expected to commence operation on 7 July 2017.

4. The Japanese authorities report that they are able to achieve the economic objectives of bail-in by capitalising a bridge institution to which functions have been transferred and by liquidating the residual firm via powers to separate assets and liabilities of a failed institution. However, it is not clear that the recapitalisation is achieved by converting claims of creditors of the failed institution into equity of that institution or of any successor in resolution as required by KA 3.5 (ii).

Source: 6th Report on the Implementation of Resolution Reforms, FSB, 6 July 2017