On 17 December 2025, HM Treasury published its consultation on the future regulatory regime for benchmarks and benchmark administrators. The proposals, if implemented, would mark a decisive shift away from the current UK Benchmarks Regulation (UK BMR) to a new, more targeted Specified Authorised Benchmarks Regime (SABR). The consultation is open for responses until 11 March 2026.

Why reform benchmark regulation?

The UK’s current regime, inherited from the EU, regulates millions of benchmarks and around 45 domestic administrators. The government now wants to create a more proportionate, effective, and agile framework that supports UK competitiveness and growth, while maintaining market integrity. In addition, the government acknowledges clear problems with the current framework for regulating non-UK benchmarks, which has never been implemented (the current transitional regime expires at end-2030).

SABR: a focus on systemic risk

Under SABR, only those benchmarks and administrators designated by HM Treasury (on advice from the FCA) would be regulated. The government estimates this could reduce the number of regulated administrators by 80–90%, focusing the new regime on a small number of systemically important benchmarks and administrators (in some ways similar to the UK regime before the introduction of the EU framework).

A central feature of SABR is the move away from the quantitative thresholds (such as the volume of use of a benchmark) used to determine whether benchmarks are treated as critical or significant benchmarks in the current regime. Instead, HM Treasury would designate benchmarks based on a qualitative assessment of whether the cessation or loss of representativeness of a benchmark (or the activities of an administrator) could cause significant and adverse impacts on UK financial markets, focusing on:

• the impact on the integrity of UK financial markets and consumers; and
• the impact on the market that the benchmark seeks to measure.

HM Treasury would consider whether users can switch to substitute benchmarks and whether there would be significant adverse effects for UK financial markets, the market measured (or related markets) or consumers if the benchmark ceases to be provided with adequate notice or becomes unrepresentative.

For administrators, the FCA and HM Treasury would also consider the aggregate impact of all benchmarks administered by a firm. Even if individual benchmarks are not systemically important, an administrator could be designated if the combined effect of the cessation of all its benchmarks poses systemic risk.

Overseas benchmarks

Only designated overseas administrators and benchmarks would need to comply with the UK regime to provide their benchmarks in the UK, although the government expects that most overseas benchmarks would be out of scope.

The government proposes a new overseas recognition regime to replace the current equivalence regime for overseas benchmarks. It seeks views on whether it should also replace the recognition and endorsement regimes for overseas benchmarks under the current framework. Alternatively, overseas administrators of designated benchmarks could be required to seek authorisation in the UK by setting up a branch, supervised under the FCA's approach to international firms.

Other key features of SABR

No voluntary opt-in. Only benchmarks and administrators designated by HM Treasury would be regulated; there would be no option for voluntary regulation.

Firm-facing requirements. The FCA would have rule-making powers to set requirements for authorised administrators, replacing the requirements currently in the UK BMR.

ESG and commodity benchmarks. These benchmarks could be designated if systemically important, but otherwise would not be regulated as such. The FCA would be able to set different requirements for these benchmarks, reflecting their unique characteristics. The government seeks views on the impact of the loss of exemption from the new ESG ratings regime and the loss of the 'kitemark' for climate transition or Paris-aligned benchmarks.

Removal of use restrictions. The current requirement for UK supervised entities only to use regulated benchmarks would be removed. FCA will consult on rules for authorised firms on managing risk from use of benchmarks (whether or not designated). The government seeks views on the impact of SABR on other frameworks, e.g. prospectuses and the benchmark definition in the UK market abuse regime.

Contributors. Existing powers over contributors would continue to apply to contributors to designated benchmarks (but might be expanded to cover non-price contributions to benchmarks).

Intervention and wind-down powers. The FCA’s powers would be adapted to cover all designated benchmarks, not just those based on contributions. The FCA would have powers to restrict the use of designated benchmarks to protect market integrity and consumers and to restrict the use of a benchmark by an authorised firm where a benchmark administrator is not compliant with SABR or there is a risk to the FCA's regulatory objectives.

How does this differ from the new EU benchmarks regime?

From 1 January 2026, the EU regime will be limited to critical benchmarks, significant benchmarks, EU low-carbon benchmarks and some commodity benchmarks. Benchmarks are significant if EU usage reaches a €50bn threshold or the benchmarks are designated as significant by EU supervisors, but EU administrators of some benchmarks can opt-in to regulation. EU supervised entities continue to be subject to restrictions on using unregulated benchmarks but with exemptions for some non-EU spot FX benchmarks. For more information, see Clifford Chance, EU cuts scope of Benchmarks Regulation (June 2025).

Authors: Caroline Dawson and Chris Bates